The War for Information: The Polish Response to Martial Law by Fedorowicz, Hania M.
THE WAR FOR INFORMATION: 
THE POLISH RESPONSE TO MARTIAL LAW 
Hania M. Fedorowicz 
Researcher 
House of Commons 
Ottawa 
Adecree declaring martial law in Poland was passed by the Council of State to go into 
effect at midnight Dec. 12,1981. The announcement was made on Polish radio in the 
early hours of December 13, on behalf of the newly-created Military Council for 
National Salvation (acronym WRON in Polish). Martial law was lifted on July 22, 
1983. During this period Poles lived under a "state of war," the literal meaning of the 
Polish term: stan wojenny. To ordinary Poles the intent was singular: Jaruzelski had 
declared war on the nation. 
In the following paper, I place the war for information during this two and one 
half year period in the centre of the conflict between government and governed; on 
the one hand, in rejecting the state monopoly over information, society rejected the 
legitimacy of the military government. On the other hand, the free exchange of infor- 
mation became the institution around which people organized spontaneously and thus 
gained a measure of personal and political autonomy from the structures of party, 
military and state. The war for uncensored and unmanipulated information under mar- 
tial law can be seen as the legacy of the independent, self-governing trade union 
Solidarnosc, for whom the free exchange of information had been its raison d'etre and 
its only defence (Tymowski, 1982: p. 30). 
Three Polish riddles establish the context for the topic1. Where is the greatest 
freedom found? In England under Thatcher, in Germany under Kohl or in Poland 
under Jaruzelski? 2) How does the Polish constitution differ from the American? 3) 
What is the lowest rank in the Polish army? The answers: 1) in Poland, of course. In 
England, everything which is not forbidden is allowed. In Germany, all that is not al- 
lowed is forbidden, but in Poland, all that is forbidden is allowed. 2) The Polish con- 
stitution differs from the American in that citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech. 
Under the U.S. Constitution they are guaranteed freedom after speech. 3) The lowest 
army rank is that of television announcer. 
The first riddle, paraphrased from a version dating back to the seventies, illustrates 
the peculiar tension characteristic of the attempts made by the democratic opposition 
after 1976 to live "in the truth", as-if free, by signing petitions with real names and ad- 
dresses and by conducting open meetings. As theorized by Adam Michnik in his 1977 
Editor's Note: This contribution was completed before the late 1988 revival of 
demands for legalization of Solidarnosc. 
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essay "A New Evolutionism", the Polish self-limiting revolution set out to challenge 
the monopoly on public life established by the political authorities and dominated by 
the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). The project called for the recapture of civic 
space, whereby people could acknowledge the subjectivity of their destiny rather than 
react as objects to the policies imposed by political authorities. These social actions, 
however, had to stop short of demanding political power. The legalization of NSZZ 
Solidarnosc in 1980 was the practical result of just such a vision. It demonstrated a 
society organizing and defending itself against a hostile and manipulating state under 
the banner in which "all that is forbidden is allowed". 
The second riddle, a product of Poland under martial law, points to the fundamen- 
tal lie at the heart of the political system in Poland. Although guaranteed in theory by 
the Constitution, freedom of speech is in practice not an unalienable right, but a 
privilege p n t e d  by the Communist party in return for obedience. Timothy Garton 
Ash summarizes the challenge wrought by what Michnik called the "politics of truth" 
against a canvas of ideologically determined lies which hold the system together (Ash, 
1986: 48). During martial law, the example of Michnik and hundreds of others refused 
to give up the gains in freedom of thought and expression made during the Solidar- 
nose period of 1980-81, even if it meant long periods of imprisonment. This was a 
moral victory for society. 
The third riddle illustrates the central importance given by the Polish political 
authorities themselves to maintaining absolute control over information. Martial law 
was in part so successful in the short term, due to the total information blockade im- 
posed on Poland both domestically and internationally. The decree on martial law was 
first broadcast over radio from temporary facilities in the Warsaw army barracks, 
known popularly as "Studio Bunker". The sight of television announcers in military 
uniform met with public derision. In associating the military with what was to become 
the most discredited institution under martial law-the television evening news- 
Jaruzelski lost all credibility in his efforts to justify military intervention as a neces- 
sary evil preferable to direct intervention by the Soviets. 
Living the Lie 
A totalitarian regime's oppressive control of all human activity is perhaps most acutely 
felt when it begins to crumble. The 1979 Report on the State of the Republic, by a 
leading think-tank of both party and non-party intellectuals, demonstrates this point: 
All in all, it seems that this pillar of the system of political power suffers from 
the same ailments as all the others: inefficiency, ineffectiveness, 
inauthenticity, and the inability to correct itself ("Experience and the Future" 
Discussion Group, 1981: 54). 
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The primary goal of the state information monopoly prior to 1980, can be charac- 
terized as the maintenance of political power through social disintegration and 
atomization, the encouragement of factionalism and an anti-intellectual bias. 
During this period the main avenues of control exercised by the party over the 
mass media included: 1) the issuing of hrectives regarding the main lines of propagan- 
policy (including the use of disinformation campaigns); 2) the appointment of 
litically trusted personnel to key positions; 3) censorship and the extended apparatus 
of resuictions on dissemination of information (ibid, : 53). Georges Mond described 
the workings of censorship (Mond 1982: 63) as the surveillance of all intellectual and 
creative work including the printed word, science, literature, art, painting, sculpture, 
music, drama and film. Wladyslaw Bienkowski, (1%9), former member of the central 
committee of the P W  and former minister of national education under Gomulka 
adds in "Engines and Brakes of Socialism" that censorship had two aims. First, to 
paralyze social life so as to prevent the expression of critical judgment or questioning 
which could lead to uncontrolled social integration. Also, to seal off the outside world 
by breaking all circulation of information so as to exclude any scales of comparison 
which might challenge the "socialist" worldview. 
Characteristically, the process of censorship is itself censored. Up to the mid- 
seventies, few editors even of the party press were aware of the extent to which regula- 
tions authorized interference by the censorship office. With the smuggling out of 
Poland in 1977 of a remarkable selection of documents by an employee from the cen- 
sorship office in Krakow and their publication first in London by Aneks and the fol- 
lowing year in Poland by the clandestine publishing house NOWA, a pervasive system 
of psychological terror and monitoring of ideas was demasked (Curry 1984: 5). 
Writers producing for the censored press often did not recognize they were censoring 
themselves until they began writing for the clandestine press. The first post-war Polish 
novel to be written without regard for the censor was Small Apocalypse, published by 
the independent literary periodical Zapis in 1979. Its author, Tadeusz Konwicki, ac- 
knowledged the struggle with himself to silence the inner censor by saying: "After 
writing for the official publishing houses for more than 25 years, I had internalized the 
process of censorship" (Sawyer 1980: p. 7). 
The history of Poland's journalistic profession throughout the fifties, sixties and 
seventies can also be seen as a history of testing the limits of censorship. The variety 
and range of publications reached its peak under Gierek with over 56 daily newspapers, 
595 magazines and periodicals. There were over 10,000 journalists working in Polish 
media in the 1970's, who were required to be highly-skilled professionals but not 
necessarily party members. It was from their ranks that the independent publishing 
movement would gather its first adherents, although for many this was a gradual 
process of abandonment of hope in reforming the system. Hanna Krall, a former jour- 
nalist for Polityka, the party paper for intellectuals, reflected on the breaking point 
after which working within the censorship system became increasingly impossible: 
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Until 1976 all of us thought we were really decent just because we didn't 
actively co-operate with official power. It's rather shameful that, when the 
opposition started, many decent writers and artists hated them because their 
appearance made it clear that active and not just passive resistance was 
possible (Holland et al. 1982: p. 17). 
A similar point was made by the sociologist J. Szczepanski before a committee 
of the Polish Sejm (Parliament): 
The publication by a censor who defected to the West of our rules 
of censorship produced a shock in scholarly circles and a feeling of 
shame with regard to such a system of control over publications 
("Experience and the Future" Discussion Group 1981: 160). 
Feelings of abhorrence at the monumentality of State manipulation of informa- 
tion was further aggravated by the discrepancy between the Polish state of economic 
affairs portrayed by the mass media, Gierek's famous propaganda of success and the 
hastening deterioration of the actual situation. The same poll responses reflected the 
conclusive opinion that a rift had been created between the social order and the politi- 
cal system based on misinformation and the arbitrariness of the censor (ibid : p. 157). 
Agnieszka Holland, Poland's leading female film director and member of Andrzej 
Wajda's "X" film unit, summed up the status of the information monopoly on the eve 
of Solidarnosc: 
In the second half of the seventies the schizophrenia between reality and what 
the government broadcast grew ever wider. With our films we were trying 
to say what everybody knew: that all official propaganda is a lie (Short 1982: 
p. 17). 
The regime became increasingly unsure of the very people, the writers, journalists and 
artists, on whom the information monopoly rested. 
Bread and Truth 
Writers and journalists were instrumental in creating the momentum for attacking the 
limits on expression. With the death of Stalin and Beirut, the intellectual community 
had already begun to test limits (Curry 1984: p. 15). Workers in 1956 marched behind 
banners which demanded "bread" but also "truth". One of the first acts of rioting 
workers was to smash the installations responsible for jamming foreign shortwave 
broadcasts. In September of 1956, censors who were also party offkials voted to go 
on strike against censorship and declared the Main Office disbanded. Out of fear that 
no control would be seen as provocation, journalists responded by forming their own 
Board of Press Review. This period of reform also saw the founding of many liberal 
journals and the resumption of the Catholic press under editors independent of the 
regime. 
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The honeymoon was over by 1957. Critical journals were closed down, censor- 
ship renewed, and many writers blacklisted. But censorship under Gomulka wascapri- 
cious, subject to intervention from party members and thus at times reversible. The 
pressure from the intellectual community was kept up as 35 intellectuals called for 
ater freedom of expression in April, 1964. Student demonstrations in 1968 arising 
of the cancellation of the play Dziady (The Forefathers) at Warsaw University, 
ain saw protests against the manipulation of censorship and anti-Jewish propagan- 
in particular. Students spread the slogan "the press lies" and undertook the 
despread burning of newspapers. During the same period, the Polish Writers' Union 
assed a resolution condemning the state's cultural policy. 
The generation of '68 began a new phase in post-war society's rejection of Com- 
munist rule. Starski called it an organized challenge to the information monopoly: 
A whole new wave of poets, graphic artists (especially poster makers...), 
novelists, critics, and photographers slowly emerged at the forefront of the 
new generation. Decisively divorced from all news media and from most of 
the possibilities of mass dissemination of their work, they nevertheless 
managed to build footholds by means of a network of student art and theatre 
festivals .... (Starski 1982: p. 35). 
According to Starski, independent artists and writers came to be seen as the only 
legitimate representatives of public opinion. One might wonder how a totalitarian 
state with all of the country's resources at its disposal, the threat of Soviet military 
might at its doorstep and the example of Hungary and Czechoslovakia behind it, could 
ssibly fail to bring its citizens under control. The answer, according to Adam Mich- 
nik, lies in tradition. Polish aspirations for an independent society based on respect 
for individual freedoms hark back to the Polish Constitution of 1791 kept alive by the 
Polish Roman Catholic Church. He notes: 
The Church provided a true barrier against totalitarian power. It was an 
institution that defended the nation's identity, its rights and values. (Michnik 
1986: p. 49.  
Independent thought was nurtured by the Church via episcopal letters, church ser- 
mons, parish bulletins, and bulletins from the Polish Episcopate'spress office, together 
with the only officially sanctioned Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny (The 
Universal Weekly), and the Catholic publishing house Znak (The Sign) both founded 
soon after the war. 
Curry documents that though the Catholic press was subject to special censorship 
regulations administered by specially trained censors, Tygodnik Powszechny even 
during the most repressive periods provided readers and writers an opportunity to sur- 
vive and to preserve fundamental values. In the decade following the repression of 
workers in 1970, Gierek's "Newspeak", which promised everything in order to ap- 
pease, actually strengthened and centralized censorship. This created the conditions 
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for a move by intellectuals into the democratic opposition because they lost hope in 
the goal of reform from within the party apparatus. 
The birth of the movement for the social defence of truth dates from the found- 
ing of KOR (the Committee for Defence of Workers) in September, 1976 in the after- 
math of workers' repression in Radom. Soon after the clandestine monthlies Biuleryn 
Informacyjny (Information Bulletin) and Komunikat (the Communique) were first 
published. Within a year, some twenty publications working clandestinely and at first 
using simple techniques such as screen-printing appeared. They ranged from literary 
and critical journals, to discussions of strategy and dialogue between workers and a 
broader readership. All of them documented the authorities' abuse of power. The 
revolution in social consciousness was furthered in May, 1977 with the founding of 
NOWA (acronym for New Publishing House), the first and largest of the independent 
publishing houses. 
In hindsight, it is clear that the independent publishing movement born after 1976, 
was an ambitious education effon aimed at the taboos and gaps in the regime's treat- 
ment of Polish history and culture. In addition, the democratic opposition began to 
identify the official media as a completely hollow and discredited institution, similar 
to the official trade unions and economic planners. In exposing the official media, the 
opposition was in fact condemning the very nature of the system of governing. Most 
importantly, perhaps the informal network of writers, editors, printers, distributors and 
readers which developed out of the need to dismbute publications in thousands of 
copies, were the beginnings of an underground network which could pass on informa- 
tion quickly and reliably. 
In short, independent publishing created a widening area of independent social 
initiative which can in retrospect be credited with breaking the back of the informa- 
tion monopoly. As one of NOWA's key organizers and most jailed members, Miros- 
law Chojecki notes: 
... in a totalitarian state it is not the law that guarantees concessions but the 
balance of power. The extent of freedom of speech depends on social 
pressures (Bielinski and Chojecki 1981: p. 36). 
KOR set an example for other independent initiatives, including groups further- 
ing independent trade unionism, KPN, (Confederation for an Independent Poland), R- 
OPCiO (Movement in Defence of Civil and Human Rights), TKN (Flying University) 
(Bartoszewski, 1985) and other informal study groups, as well as public meetings of 
all kinds, conferences and discussion clubs. It is significant that those initiatives like 
Dip ("Experience and the Future" Discussion Group) which were addressed to the 
regime, with the aim of establishment of a dialogue, met with stony official silence. 
The regime was from then on set on a collision course with a society increasingly 
hungry for political honesty. 
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"The Socialization of Truth" 
The rise of Solidarnosc provided a shift in the balance of power between society 
d the state by guaranteeing freedom of expression. In 1980-8 1 Andnej Szczypiorski 
as in transition from a state-owned society to a socialised state. In 
a1 terms a state monopoly on truth was being transformed into a so- 
tion in the creation of the truth. Such a transformation required new 
structures to accommodate the existent social pluralism. The goals as well as the in- 
ng of Solidurnosc could accommodate this social pluralism, because 
both the dissemination of information and direct social access to it. 
f August, 1980, tested the maturity of the Polish worker vis-a-vis the 
information monopoly. In it Polish journalists were evicted from the Gdansk shipyard 
on the fourth day of the strike as "collaborators" of the authorities. According to 
starski: 
The media are well orchestrated and their saving grace is their low-key 
strategy. But the media lagged behind the new awareness of the striking 
workers--the workers read the newspapers and listened to TV but did not 
pay attention to them. (Starski 1982: p. 64). 
It is on the media front that Gierek's government lost the battle in August, 
1980 (Fedorowicz 1985 ). 
Immediately after August 3 1,1980, bulletins, information sheets and newspapers 
gan to be published in every place of work. In addition an extraordinary congress 
of SDP (Association of Polish Journalists) was held in October, 1980, which passed a 
resolution calling for a report on the state of social communication in Poland. Its 
leadership furthermore began to agitate for reforms in the profession, while its newly- 
elected president, Stefan Bratkowski, was to become one of the most outspoken voices 
of reform within the party. The period between August 1980 and December 1981 saw 
explosion of debate and testing the limits in the official press and media. 
The loosening of the fetters, however, did not allow Solidarnosc to forget that the 
fetters were still basically intact. While Polish TV offered its studios and producers, 
Solidurnosc insisted on social control of the media but was not able to produce its own 
newscasts. By January, 1981, negotiators for Solidurnosc were able to wrench per- 
mission from the government for the publication of a weekly, national newspaper with 
a circulation of 500,000. When compared to Tygodnik Powszechny, whose circula- 
tion during the Solidarnosc period doubled to 80,000, the quota granted by the govem- 
ment was unprecedented, while still below actual demand. ngodnik Solidarnosc was 
particularly useful in drawing attention to and criticizing the periodic outbursts of in- 
vective in the official media against the giant trade union. The most alarming attack 
on Solidarnosc came in August, 1981, when the interruption of negotiations on the 
economy and access to the media was reported in the party-controlled media as being 
union initiated. In protest, printers across the country struck for two days on August 
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19-20 in an action named "Days without press" (Dni bezprmy). The printers' smke, 
however, did not win any major concessions from the government. 
The acute state of the crisis prompted the Polish Episcopate to urge that the 
"present users of mass media withdraw from exacerbating and provocative propagan- 
da" in its statement on August 31, 1981 (Declaration 1981: p. 2). As a result of the 
continued distortion of the union's program, Polish television was barred from the Sep- 
tember and October sessions of the first Congress of Delegates forcing it to buy footage 
from western networks. 
During this congress three out of thirteen thematic groups dealt with some aspect 
of information and dissemination. One, considered information within the trade union 
and adopted the principle of pluralism over any form of prior censorship. Another 
dealt with negotiations and protests and propaganda issues. Interestingly, propagan- 
da was considered to be of concern to union members and non-members alike and to 
aim toward a public debate with the government. In this way Solidarnosc intended to 
defend the public interest as well as the interests of union members. The most detailed 
treatment of information dissemination was carried out by the thirteenth thematic 
group, dealing with the mass media. The group defined the field as including all forms 
and aspects of "social communication". The evolving program defended the right of 
media access for all social groups proportionate to their representation in society. It 
called for the preparation of a new law on social communication, the abolition of the 
state administrative monopoly on radio and television and the formation of an ad- 
ministrative-executive body made up of representatives of all political and social 
groups to oversee programming. 
The program further called for the creation of Solidarnosc editorial staff in the 
central and regional structures of Polish radio and television; the creation of Solidar- 
nose broadcasting stations for radio and television; the creation of Solidarnosc photo- 
information and film agencies, press, phonographic and video publications, 
typographical shops and a daily national newspaper. In addition it forsaw increasing 
the circulation of the weekly to 1 million copies. Finally, the program promised to 
protect those journalists working in all forms of social communication who would 
respect the principles of the Journalist's Code of Ethics. In short, the program of the 
first Congress of Solidarnosc provided a far-reaching vision of the socialization of 
mass media within the existing structures and the development of new structures to be 
created by law, in accordance with the unrealized principles of the Polish Constitu- 
tion. 
Solidarnosc found common cause with its program for socializing communica- 
tion in the journalists' community (Taborski, 1982). Journalist Maciej Iowiecki 
presented apaper on the mass media at the interrupted Congress of Polish Culture held 
in Warsaw on December 11 and 12, 1981, in which he argued for placing the media 
under social control in order to end the government's monopoly on information. The 
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itory actions of the government throughout 1980-81 indicate that the regime was 
most frightened by the loss of control of the mass media demanded by Solidarnosc. 
consequently the regime fought hardest to prevent this from occurring. 
The War for Information: "Communication as Resistance" 
The widespread social response to martial law from the point of view of 
communication was resistance and regrouping of independent information networks, 
often inspired by the experiences of the Polish underground during the Nazi 
occupation. Within hours, the first leaflets were circulating in Warsaw, within weeks 
the first information sheets on repression and resistance werebeing printed. AKrakow 
flyer captured the essence of the war for information: 
... Information about the resistance is the most effective help you can give to 
those struggling, since support by force is impossible. The miners strike in 
Peczory or Kolymy mines is a hopeless cause, because those strikers can be 
shot, drowned or gassed and the world will find out about it in a hundred 
years. But the whole world knows about the struggle of the miners in Silesia 
and therefore the authorities hesitate to use force. Information was the 
reason. This obvious truth is wonderfully understood by the authorities, 
which have undertaken an information and communication blockade unseen 
in world history. In the struggle waged today by the workers, we cannot count 
on a military victory, but a moral one .... Re-write this flyer and pass it on to 
your fiiends for recopying (Krakow, December 19, 1981. Zwiazkowiec 
1982: p. 1). 
After an initial period of disorientation as new leaders in the publishing move- 
ment stepped in to replace those cut off by martial law or interned, old and totally new 
publishing groups went into action. Working on poor equipment, under threat of harsh 
punishment, curfew conditions and constant patrols, the independent press could 
nevertheless count on an army of volunteers. Despite an atmosphere of fear, many 
imaginative actions attest to a prevailing sense of social cohesiveness. When distribu- 
tion of the underground press became difficult due to police checks of suspiciously 
large bags, Solidarnosc appealed to Warsaw dwellers to all cany large bags. The 
public responded. Print-runs varied from hundreds to thousands of issues. Tygodnik 
Mazowsze (Mazowsze Weekly) ran between 15,000 and 40,000 copies while Solidar- 
nosc Malopolska issued between 15,000 and 25,000 weekly (Kalabinski 1984: p. 70). 
Innovation was continuous, as reflected in the title CDN (To Be Continued) which 
combined in its very name the concept of communication and resistance. Specialized 
publications included Godnosc (Dignity) for policemen in Warsaw and Reduta 
(Redoubt) for soldiers. 
While most of Solidarnosc facilities were raided and confiscated, including paper 
supplies, presses, archives, audio-visual and photographic equipment, during the night 
of December 12-13,1981, some publishers like NOWA were accustomed to clandes- 
tine conditions and were able to resume activities with some continuity after the initial 
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period of confusion. In other cases, new publishing groups were founded. About 
eighteen major and minor publishing houses were in operation during martial law with 
over 100 titles. Within six months of the clampdown, some 1,500 news sheets, bul- 
letins or pamphlets were being published, on the shop-floor, by neighborhood groups, 
Solidarnosc structures and even high school students. This figure, which included 
about 100 factory publications, fell to below 1,000 by late summer of 1982 as co-or- 
dination improved and publishing efforts amalgamated. 
Protests against the crass and ineffective propaganda of the early days of martial 
law took interesting and poetic forms. There were the famous evening strolls in 
Swidnik and Lublin by thousands of citizens, during the time of the evening television 
news (Zlotkowski et al. 1983: p. 1614). Television sets were even turned towards the 
windows to underscore the fact that nobody was watching. The retaliation of the 
authorities by turning off the electricity and water and by later imposing stricter Limits 
on movement when even more people turned out into the streets for "strolls" under- 
scores how effective society could be in demonstrating its independence from official 
mind-control. Zbigniew Bujak, regional chairman of Mazowsze, published an appeal 
taken up in other parts of the country to boycott the press: "Let the piles of unsold 
newspapers at the newsstands demonstrate our opposition to military rule". Accord- 
ing to the estimates of Tygodnik Mazowsze, the appeal was by and large respected. Up 
to 80% of official party newspapers remained unsold in the kiosks. 
The most spectacular form of resistance under martial law was the creation in new 
form of Radio Solidarnosc. The first broadcast on home radios in many districts of 
Warsaw on April 12, 1982, lasted eight minutes. The next on April 30 called for a 
"repossession" of May 1 celebrations. In spite of a massive mobilization of radio ex- 
perts and listening devices, authorities continued to be foiled in their search for the 
transmitters. Radio Solidarnosc continued to broadcast in Warsaw until late June, when 
the action was discontinued for several months due to the loss of one of its transmit- 
ters and intensive interference. Broadcasts were then moved to other cities of which 
there were ten in all. They constituted an incalculable breakthrough both morally and 
psychologically in the war for information. 
One of the longest and most impressive smkes under martial law was carried out 
by members of ZASP (Association of Polish Stage Artists), against Polish radio and 
television. The public joined in this action by literally hissing or applauding those ar- 
tists off the stage who were known to have "broken" the strike by collaborating with 
the authorities and appearing on radio or television or in performing for the military. 
All manner of cultural expression with the sanction of the state was viewed as a 
betrayal, as the following appeal to painters published in the underground paper Ob- 
serwator Wielkopolski testified: 
A l'heure ou les droits de l'homme les plus 616mentaires sont bafoues en 
Pologne et oh la voix de l'individu et celle de la majorit6 de la nation sont 
etouffks, l'art fonctionnant avec ie consentement officiel deviendra une 
fausse facade. Ne crkz pas ceue facade ...( Zlotkowski 1983: p. 182). 
Father Jerzy Popieluszko's sermons on culture captured the spirit of an embattled 
counay under martial law. In a sermon shortly before his kidnapping and murder by 
state security police in 1983, he articulated the intensity of the struggle noting: 
The war started once again against Truth and freedom of expression, against 
freedom and the greatness of ideas spoken out loudly, influenced by 
awakened conscience. Every remark about Human Rights is now labelled a 
hostile activity (Short 1985: p. 12). 
"The Struggle for Monopoly" 
In response to the information blackout levelled on Poland on December 13, 1981. 
which paralyzed all communication and movement, managing editor William Thomas 
of theLos Angeles 7'imes commented: "We've never seen such a complete clampdown 
on all avenues of information" (Castro 1981: p. 72). The international community too 
was reduced to dependence on official Polish sources until January 9,1982. In Munich 
these were translated and distributed to western news agencies (Grotzky 1982). The 
preparation of the media black-out months before December 13 confirms the 
suggestion that the regime was biding its time throughout 1980 and 1981, stalling and 
humouting Solidarnosc, while retrenching and preparing the internal coup. Advance 
plans for martial law included detailed measures concerning the mass media, based 
on an existing plan for the mass media in the event of war (Lechowicz 1982: p. 4 1). 
In July, 1981. Zdzislaw Balicki, the head of the PUWP's Committee for Radio and 
Television Affairs was replaced by hardliner Wladyslaw Loranc. After July, Polish 
media conducted an escalating smear campaign against Solidarnosc. Special 
programs for the first week of martial law were prepared in advance. Loranc was 
relieved of his duties in December, 1982, suggesting he had only been used to carry 
ough the media plan for the military coup. 
Measures taken under the decree on martial law included a curfew, ban on travel 
and transport, limiting postal and telecommunication services, censoring of mail and 
telephone conversations, requisitioning of radio transmitters and two-way radio 
receivers, a ban on photo-taking of certain buildings and in certain areas, the suspen- 
sion of a11 newspapers and journals with the exception of Trybuna Luda, the PUWP 
ly, and Zolnierz Wolnosci, the daily of the military. All regional radio and television 
broadcasts were suspended and only one national television channel was left in opera- 
tion (Cave 1982: p. 3-5). In addition, anyone over 17 could be interned given "jus- 
tified suspicions" of threat to state security. All organizations were suspended, all 
publication, printing and dissemination of information required permission from the 
authorities, no public meetings could be held without permission and badges and 
uniforms were banned. 
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The security apparatus devoted great energy to rooting out independent sources 
of information in an effort to regain control of the circulation of information. This 
sometimes involved such extremes as using children to spy on parents, as the under- 
ground press reported: 
A Wroclaw, les reprksentants locaux du W.R.O.N. ont convoquk des 
directeurs d'koles maternelles en leur suggerant d'obtbnir des enfants 
frQuentant leur Ctablissement qu'ils fournissent des renseignements sur les 
parents qui utilisent des machines B krires B la maison (Zlotkowski et al. 
1983: p. 41). 
"Studio Bunker" for radio and television began operations on December 14 with 452 
selected personnel including journalists and technicians, Mass media under martial 
law were partially militarized; failure to follow orders could result in charges being 
brought in a military court. An addendum to the decree on martial law authorized the 
closing of the second television channel and three out of four radio programs. A leave 
of absence was granted to all personnel leaving only 452 out of 6,000 before martial 
law. The government Press Office under Jerzy Urban was run by only 42 people. Many 
members of the Association of Polish Journalists, 75% of whom had been Solidarnosc 
members, were interned. In general, the propaganda apparatus could only mobilize 
small numbers of people with little credibility in the eyes of the public. 
Propaganda utilized under martial law aimed to intimidate and discourage resis- 
tance. Solidarnosc was made to appear responsible for the crisis in attempting to seize 
power and in supposedly having drawn up secret hit-lists of party functionaries. At 
the same time, martial law was offered as the only solution to restore equilibrium and 
normalcy, with a version of the propaganda of success revived. The blatency and u- 
biquitousness of the "big lie" led some people to observe that only obituaries were 
true. Harsh sentences for illegal information activities were handed down 
(Wasilewska 1982). Among them five years for publishing and possession of un- 
authorized literature and leaflets. Between one and three years for high school stu- 
dents. Five years prison and four years suspension of civil rights for posting of leaflets 
with "false informationt'. Four years for writing poems, letters and songs containing 
"false information". It is telling that the number of people sentenced on charges of 
"false information" was greater than those on charges of organizing strikes and 
protests. Zdzislaw Najder, a literary critic, left Poland after the takeover to accept the 
directorship of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe. He was sentenced to death 
in absentia on charges of sedition. 
The fact that the regime was forced to dissolve (i.e. ban) many of the hundreds of 
associations, societies, social and professional organizations suspended by the decree 
on martial law, was evidence of the failure of threats, jail sentences, and appeals to co- 
operate with the military. "Normalization" proved to be impossible. The Association 
of Polish Journalists (SDP) was one of the first organizations to be banned in March, 
1982 with a new Association of Journalists of the Polish People's Republic founded 
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two days later with 97 members. Two years later, only one-third of former SDP's 8,000 
members had joined, many of the 5 ,60  new members being in fact clerks, typists and 
advertising people. Other banned organizations to follow were Z4SP (December, 
1982), the Union of Polish Visual Artists (June, 1983) and the board of Polish PEN 
the same day. The Film-makers Union remained suspended for two years, at which 
time Andrzej Wajda resigned as chairman. In the caw where new unions were set up, 
they remained unpopular, obedient but powerless. 
The harshness of persecution against journalists was unequalled in any other 
group. Five of the top elected officers of SDP were on the internment lists; 56 jour- 
nalists from provincial towns were interned. Over 2,000 journalists were sacked from 
their jobs, of which 1,200 were permanently blacklisted. For others, their publications 
simply folded. In all, 26 editors-in-chief were relieved of their responsibilities. In 
radio and television 513 were fired. Many others took advantage of early retirement, 
refusing to work under militarized conditions. Journalists turned to "honest work", as 
one journalist called it who advertised for such in the want ads, as taxi-drivers, bee- 
keepers, store-clerks, cabinet-makers and night watchmen. 
Verification procedures were carried out in all militarized enterprises, such as 
mines and especially among journalists. In the first days of martial law, approximate- 
ly 3-400 conversations took place with promises of promotions, wage increases, con- 
sumer goods and apartments and even positions as foreign correspondents in exchange 
for a pledge of loyalty. Copies of a declaration for signing were provided. The As- 
sociation of Polish Journalists estimated that only about 12 individuals agreed. The 
full-fledged verification campaign was conducted in the subsequent months before 
commissions of up to 12 people. A new purge in the summer of 1983 saw the dismiss- 
al of a further 230 journalists for "insufficient professional activity". Loyalty oaths 
were a means of subjugating internees as well. Actress Halina Mikolajska poignantly 
summed up their usage by military authorities in a letter from Darlowek camp on April 
13, 1982: 
From the very first day we have been under pressure to sign loyalty oaths, 
oaths of obedience towards 'the new laws' .... Perhaps someday someone will 
describe the methods used to force people to sign those 'documents'; it will 
be a fat book of psychological - sometimes even physical - terror, of 
destroying people and blackmailing them through their children, parents, 
work, illnesses, trials,- in a word, the story of a 'pneumatic drill' applied to 
minds and hearts (Mikolajska 1983: p. 16). 
Acatalogue of measures to restore control over the mass media would not be complete 
without mentioning the use of disinformation. A false issue of Tygodnik Mazowsze was 
published on July 28,1982 with a supposed appeal from the underground Solidarnosc 
leadership (TKK) to suspend all protests for three months. Prominent figures were 
cited as approving of WRON and of internment (Zlotkowski et al., 1983: 42). 
Documents were manufactured in other circumstances as "proof' of Solidarnosc 
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intentions to kill the families of party members. In other cases, television news showed 
the closing of internment camps which had been especially "installed for the filming 
(ibid. : p. 152). 
Parallel with attacks on working professionals and on the underground, the 
military regime prepared for the lifting of martial law by enacting new and repressive 
legislation. Withdrawn were most of the freedoms won by Solidarnosc, as well as 
some dating before 1980. This legislation included a new law on state and official 
secrets (December 14,1982); new amendments to the law on censorship and amend- 
ments to the Penal Code with penalties for "dissemination of false information" and 
passing of information to foreign centers (July 1983). A new law on the Polish Press 
Agency (PAP) in 1983; and a new Press law were promulgated in January, 1984. 
(Pszenicki 1983). While making it more difficult to live alongside the regime, these 
new acts of legislation strengthened the resolve of many among them "verified" in- 
dividuals to support independent and clandestine activities. 
Having passed through an initial phase of promising reforms while arguing the 
necessity of military intervention, the regime was rebuffed by spontaneous strikes and 
widespread resistance. Knowing full well it was the enemy, society regrouped to carry 
out massive street demonstrations and protests on appropriate anniversaries 
throughout 1982. These actions, while proving to the regime the extent of social hos- 
tility, drew the full force of repression as a reply. There was use of the riot police, ar- 
rests, high fines and loss of employment and housing. A new concept of "protracted 
struggle" gradually emerged, (Kalabinski 1984: p. 70) as society sought to reconstitute 
itself in the underground through publishing, education and cultural activities. 
"Civic Society" 
A key element of the continued self-organisation of civic society was the refusal to 
collaborate with any institution identified with WRON. Here the actors' boycott by 
ZASP(Union of Stage Artists) was of tremendous significance as an example to others. 
Many shared the attitude of Halina Mikolajska, a leading actress who refused to leave 
internment under special protection from a well-known theatre director. She wrote in 
explanation that, "Loyalty to lawlessness means a pact with the devil". Despite 
financial hardships, the artists' boycott of television was almost total and constituted 
the longest strike under martial law, lasting till the dissolution of the association. The 
sixty or seventy strike-breakers found themselves completely ostracized socially by 
colleagues and by the public. 
The military authorities attempted to break the strike by offering higher wages or 
by accusing artists of destroying the national culture. In response, actors organized 
special performances in theatres and churches as an alternative to television, appeal- 
ing to the public in the underground press to support the boycott: 
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Warsaw actors, members of Solidarity, appeal to workers of the capital: Do 
not go to the cinema to see the propaganda trash of [pro-regime] directors 
like Poreba and Petelski. Go to the good theatres! By filling the house you 
support the TV boycott launched by the actors. You vote against the junta 
(Hofman 1983: p. 21). 
These performances were both a gesture of contempt for WRON and an affirma- 
tion of values represented by Solidarnosc. Society not only voted with its feet by at- 
~nd ing  these performances; but created an actors' fund to provide stipends for actors 
ycotting television which gathered 800,000 zlotys by May, 1982. The effect of the 
boycott was that new television production was reduced to one quarter of the planned 
volume. Many people ceased to pay the television license fee. 
It is important to underscore the continuity of meaning between the actions of an 
artistic or intellectual elite and that of society at large. Boycotting actors or directors, 
as well as writers or journalists who resigned their positions or found themselves fired, 
did so in the context of many everyday acts of resistance or shows of independence 
by ordinary people. A writer deemed to have lost face by appearing on television woke 
up to find his novels piled up on his doorstep by hundreds of angered readers who 
ded to an underground appeal to return his works for "paper recycling", These 
were typical of a conscious society living out its subjectivity. Alternative forms 
of expression sprang up everywhere, with the creation of undergroundbadges, postage 
stamps, fake money satirizing the military authorities and wall messages and graffiti. 
While theatre performances often moved into church premises and many masses began 
to incorporate dramatic elements and recitations, journalists found new homes for their 
professional work. Within a few months of martial law takeover, the most popular 
newspaper in Warsaw was the Blind Co-operator, where many former journalists from 
Polityka became employed. Other experts in economics and international politics 
were writing in publications like the Angler. Stefan Bratkowski, the president of the 
Association of Polish Journalists until its dissolution took up a new form of publish- 
ing by recording an hour-long report on sound cassette once a month for duplication 
by others. Bratkowski was also at the centre of a mutual aid programme for about 
journalists fired from their jobs. 
The war for information, however, did not cease with the lifting of martial law, 
as Bratkowski points out, with new fronts of conflict continuing to open up. Television 
d radio continue to maintain lists of directors and actors who are out of favour. Due 
to surveillance of public places, the sound and video cassette are taking on increasing 
rtance as influential media. 
Alternative sources of news continued to be the mainstay of the self-organizing 
publishing movement. Western short-wave radio came to be popularly called simply 
"the news" under martial law. Government spokesman Jerzy Urban acknowledged its 
importance: "If you would close Radio Free Europe, the underground would cease 
to exist" (Forbes Jr. 1986: p. A21). In addition two underground domestic news 
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agencies were created. Informacja Solidarnosci (Solidarity Information), provided a 
twice weekly bulletin with information on Solidarnosc activities, in which the Tem- 
porary Co-ordinating Committee documented instances of repression. Niezalezna 
Agencja Informacyjna (Independent News Agency) provided domestic and foreign 
news to sixty publications, especially provincial ones, as well as a broadcast monitor- 
ing service. Emigre publishing houses continued their close collaboration with the 
underground, both by sending in foreign materials and by publishing materials from 
Poland. Other areas of action were also extensions of earlier work begun or developed 
during the 1980-81 period, including educational networks for which the underground 
began to print texibooks. It is interesting to note that the first self-education classes 
under martial law began in the internment camps. 
The regime's response after two years of failure to win over writers and actors 
was to give exclusive priority in publishing and performance to "ideologically com- 
mitted" writers and artists. As a result, the situation in Poland has been further polarized 
between the unofficial and the official culture since the suspension of martial law. 
While official cultural policy has become more repressive since 1984, there is some 
indication that the regime is willing to tolerate a new form of "co-existence" provided 
that independent culture does not form a mass movement like Solidarnosc. Small, 
decentralized initiatives will be tolerated, with periodic "crack-downs", imposition of 
exorbitant fines and jail sentences which will be suspended once the "example" has 
been made, as long as opposition activities remain fragmented. The hope of the regime 
is that ordinary people will sink into apathy. As the opposition continues to build 
autonomous social and cultural institutions, however, there is little indication that the 
civic space increasingly taken up by society since martial law will diminish. 
The list of initiatives of social self-organisation in Poland under martial law is im- 
pressive. Central to the motivation for risking personal security and livelihood is the 
perception that no middle ground between society and the state is possible after mar- 
tial law. A return to the political situation existing prior to 1980 is as impossible as 
forgetting eighteen months of almost-freedom. The breaking of the information 
monopoly by the democratic opposition in the late seventies, the extension of the idea 
of the social defense of truth during the Solidarnosc period into a program for social 
communication and the creation of independent centres and networks of information 
dissemination have been a critical factor if not a precondition for the reconstitution of 
civil society since martial law. 
Western visitors are drawn into making a choice between giving legitimacy to the 
regime or siding with society, a choice which put Leonard Cohen on the blacklist of 
Polish Radio for having lent moral support to hunger strikers. More recently, Canadian 
author Rick Salutin found himself unprepared for the political sophistication required 
of visitors by the polarization of state and society in Poland. In agreeing to appear at 
an official conference on culture, he realized too late that it was a "mistake": 
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In Canada, it seems to me, the relationship between people and government 
is based largely on bad faith and manipulation but it contains some kind of 
grudging limited trust .... Here [in Poland] the disjunction between people and 
regime is so deep, a staggering breakdown of communication. What 
communication? (Salutin 1986-7: p. 13). 
Salutin's description of the present stand-off relationship confirms that 
zelski's government, in saving the state, has irrevocably lost the nation. 
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In conclusion I would like to say, that I 
absolutely disagree with my own opinion. 
